Increasingly the lines are blurred between a strict empirical pursuit of experimental observation that is practiced in the laboratory, “on the bench,” as researchers say, and philosophical investigation of the world, “from the armchair,” which is an image of philosophy that draws criticism from some and raises the ire of many philosophers who see their work as more substantive than a priori reflection on topics detached from the natural world of experience.
Both portraits–the empirically-driven scientist and the armchair philosopher, are caricatures. Scientists adopt philosophical presuppositions that inform their experimental design to derive empirical data. Famously, Einstein’s moment of illumination on the path toward articulating his theory of special relativity was conceived by ‘thought experiment.’
There is a worry held by many contemporary philosophers that ‘scientism’ is on the rise, to the detriment of philosophy. Scientism is defined as unqualified deference to the empirical sciences as the only method by which a serious investigator pursues truth.
My attitude toward inquiry finds a seat at the table for both careful thought and careful experimentation. These are not mutually exclusive methods. I resist the idea that ‘scientism’ threatens philosophy, yet I also affirm that our philosophical positions should not wander so far from science that our philosophical theories become incompatible with evidence derived from the bench.
I recently wrote my first (of hopefully many) posts for the public philosophy blog, A Philosopher’s Take. There I explore this issue of philosophy and the threat of scientism, and I ultimately argue that scientism is a non-threat to contemporary analytic philosophy. If you’ve found these brief paragraphs interesting, I hope you’ll click over to read my recent post.